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Katerina Dalacoura
Katerina Dalacoura is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. Her main research 
interests are human rights, democracy and democracy promotion in the
Middle East; political Islam; and culture and religion in the theory of
International Relations. Her most recent book, Islamist Terrorism and
Democracy in the Middle East was published by Cambridge University 
Press in 2011. 
2011 has been a year of tremendous, unprecedented popular mobilisation in the Arab
Middle East. Developments are on-going and the future is open-ended and uncertain.
Nevertheless, we can already discern how the uprisings are beginning to transform the 
political landscape and, in particular, how they may affect the prospects for democratisation
in the Arab world.
Each one of the 2011 Arab uprisings must be treated on its own merits but, for the 
purposes of exploring the prospects for democratisation, we can divide them into three
broad types or categories. In the first, mass civic revolts led to the peaceful overthrow 
of powerful dictators; this was the case of Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. In the second category, uprisings led to internal fracture, 
violence and even civil war. In the case of Libya, revolt invited foreign military 
intervention and ultimately led to the overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi. In Bahrain, the
uprising was brutally suppressed. In Yemen, there has been political confrontation and 
a simmering crisis. In Syria a popular revolt is continuing but the regime is attempting 
to suppress it. The third category comprises Arab states which did not experience major
upheavals. The partial exceptions are Morocco and Jordan where ruling monarchs, faced
with a degree of popular challenge, tried to forestall an even bigger one by offering 
political concessions.
The reasons behind the uprisings and the factors which determined their success 
or failure are closely linked to making judgements about political change.
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An explosive mix of socio-economic and political grievances lay behind all the 
uprisings. Poverty is not in itself an explanation – Libya and Tunisia where rebellions
occurred are relatively better off than other Arab states – although the successful 
provision of economic benefits inoculated some regimes from trouble (for instance in
the Arab Gulf states). 
At the heart of the matter are relative deprivation, a fall of standards, and a clash
between expectations and reality. Youth unemployment, corruption and dropping 
living standards intensified in the years of economic crisis following 2008. It would 
be a mistake, however, to see the uprisings as being driven primarily by economic
grievances. Socio-economic and political discontent are impossible to disentangle 
but the demands articulated by the uprisings appear to be of the latter kind – 
if not democracy at least for ‘dignity’ and ‘freedom’. 
The articulation of these political demands during the uprisings will be an important
driving force for the future. Another issue, which will be relevant to the region’s
prospects for democratisation, is the extent to which popular mobilisation was the
achievement of pre-existing civil society and political opposition groups. Prior to 2011,
there was a consensus that these were weak and unable to challenge 
authoritarian structures throughout the Arab world. It may be that, in some cases, this
judgement was wrong; in Tunisia, for instance, the country’s main trade union (UGTT)
was instrumental in organising the demonstrations which overthrew Ben Ali. But in
Egypt it seems (to this researcher at least) that, although civil society and opposition
groups did play a role in the uprising, they were not the primary movers of a largely
spontaneous event. The lack of strong pre-existing opposition structures in the case 
of Egypt, and even more so in other places such as Libya, will make it difficult to 
channel the popular uprisings into institutionalised political groups and institutions.
Accounting for the success or failure of the uprisings, where they occurred, requires us
to look at two other factors (which will also influence the prospects for 
democratisation in each given case). The first is the degree to which regimes were 
able to retain the support of key institutions, most notably the army. In the case of
Tunisia and Egypt the army moved against the presidents. In Syria, Bahrain and Yemen
it did not, and the regimes have not fallen, at least for now. In the case of Libya it 
took foreign intervention to achieve the ousting of the dictator. The second factor 
is the degree to which regimes were able to retain support of significant social 
groups. In Tunisia and Egypt they were not able to do so. In the cases of Libya, Syria
and Bahrain and Yemen they did and, as a result, the revolts lacked the all-engulfing
nature of the Tunisian and Egyptian events. 
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The above analysis of the uprisings’ causes and consequences helps us to think about
prospects for the future and demonstrates that there will be no uniform 
outcome with regards to democratisation. The first category is the most hopeful. 
In Tunisia the combination of long-standing state institutions, a historically vibrant civil
society and political class (which Ben Ali did not manage to eradicate) and 
widespread consensus in seeking the ouster of the dictator, render its prospects 
excellent. In Egypt the worst excesses of the previous regime will be reduced, and there
will be improvement in the protection of civil and political rights, but the 
continuing dominance of the army and the enduring strength of the political and
socio-economic establishment mean that change will be limited. 
Prospects are not good for societies in the second category. In Libya, the overthrow of
Gadhafi’s regime will almost certainly not have happened without foreign 
intervention; moreover, Libya’s weak state institutions and civil society do not readily
lend themselves to democratisation. In Yemen, regime change may mean state 
collapse; in Bahrain suppression of the movement has put an end to hopes for a 
democratic opening in the short to medium term; and Syria is in the throes of civil 
war. In our third set of cases, change will be superficial. In Morocco and Jordan 
constitutional amendments will perhaps permit a greater degree of political 
contestation but Kings Mohammed and Abdullah respectively have not allowed 
their powers to be restricted. 
The role Islamist movements will play in these processes is an important 
consideration. However diverse they were, one generalisation can be made about the
uprisings: None were led by Islamist movements and in none of them was an Islamic
state a primary demand. Nevertheless, the uprisings will affect the Islamists’ position.
In cases of on-going violent conflict, as in Syria and in Libya, more extreme versions 
of Islamism, alongside secular extremist movements, may come to the fore. 
In Morocco and Jordan, mainstream Islamists will not deviate greatly from their stance
of being ‘loyal oppositions’. 
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The most interesting developments will occur in Tunisia and Egypt, where Islamists 
are taking part in emerging political processes. Overall, they may benefit from the
opening up of political systems and their support will increase. However, they will 
not achieve electoral majorities. In the long run, they will lose out politically because
they will fail to deliver concrete ideological alternatives to their citizenry, concentrating
(as they do) on moral and social issues. The experience of Iran, where a purportedly
‘Islamic’ system has in fact failed to deliver the goods to its population and has become
profoundly unpopular with its own people, will be replicated in those parts of the 
Arab world where Islamist movements engage in political processes or achieve power.
Looking ahead through a policy lens, the emergence of stable democracies in the 
Arab region, where they occur, may or may not give rise to pro-Western regimes or 
at the very least solid and reliable interlocutors for Western governments. In the 
short term, the uprisings are causing instability. This is a price worth paying if it leads
to some positive developments in future. In any case there is nothing that Western 
governments can do to prevent it (just as they played no role in causing or shaping 
the course of the uprisings, with the exception of Libya), even though the democracy
promotion bureaucratic machines are already being put in motion to help out with
democratic ‘transitions’. 
